Natural Capacities and Democracy as a Good-in-Itself
Josiah Ober
Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics: July (2006)
Abstract
A paper on moral and political philosophy, arguing on Aristotelian grounds, that democracy is not only an instrumental good, but a good-in-itself for humans, because the exercise of constitutive natural capacities is and end, necessary for true happiness (understood as eudaimonia), and democracy (understood as association in decision) is a constitutive natural human capacity of humans.
Amartya Sen (1999) has described democracy as a “universal value.” In making his case for universality, Sen, like other theorists of democracy, focuses on democracy’s instrumental effectiveness at securing other good ends (e.g. in preventing famine), not on democracy as an end-in-itself. The value of democracy as an instrument for securing many of the other things that we value is well established; I take it as given that a substantial reason for valuing democracy lies in its effectiveness as a reliable instrument for gaining and defending other valued ends, including liberty and social justice. But does democracy’s value lie entirely in its instrumental effectiveness? Suppose that an instrument of governance (say, a genuinely benevolent form of dictatorship) were devised that delivered various highly valued ends more efficiently and reliably than does democracy. Could democracy then be set aside without causing anyone grievous harm? Or does democracy have noninstrumental value for us? Might democracy even be of fundamental value in that it is necessary for true human happiness? Ought we, in short, to value democracy not only as an (apparently but not certainly) irreplaceable instrument but also as a primary good-in-itself?
Josiah Ober
Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics: July (2006)
Abstract
A paper on moral and political philosophy, arguing on Aristotelian grounds, that democracy is not only an instrumental good, but a good-in-itself for humans, because the exercise of constitutive natural capacities is and end, necessary for true happiness (understood as eudaimonia), and democracy (understood as association in decision) is a constitutive natural human capacity of humans.
Amartya Sen (1999) has described democracy as a “universal value.” In making his case for universality, Sen, like other theorists of democracy, focuses on democracy’s instrumental effectiveness at securing other good ends (e.g. in preventing famine), not on democracy as an end-in-itself. The value of democracy as an instrument for securing many of the other things that we value is well established; I take it as given that a substantial reason for valuing democracy lies in its effectiveness as a reliable instrument for gaining and defending other valued ends, including liberty and social justice. But does democracy’s value lie entirely in its instrumental effectiveness? Suppose that an instrument of governance (say, a genuinely benevolent form of dictatorship) were devised that delivered various highly valued ends more efficiently and reliably than does democracy. Could democracy then be set aside without causing anyone grievous harm? Or does democracy have noninstrumental value for us? Might democracy even be of fundamental value in that it is necessary for true human happiness? Ought we, in short, to value democracy not only as an (apparently but not certainly) irreplaceable instrument but also as a primary good-in-itself?
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