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Gambling, Threats and Miscalculations: Discussing Rome’s Reaction to the Fall of Saguntum and the Beginning of the Second Punic War

Gambling, Threats and Miscalculations: Discussing Rome’s Reaction to the Fall of Saguntum and the Beginning of the Second Punic War

By Meghan Poplacean

Hirundo: the McGill Journal of Classical Studies, Vol.12 (2013-14)

Second Punic War

Introduction: The debate surrounding the causes of the Second Punic War is by no means a new one. Ancient and modern scholars alike have debated, examined and subsequently re-examined the data countless times. Whether Hannibal was fueled by sacred oath, as Polybius posits, or the fervor for war came to him in a dream, the result was the same; Rome and Carthage would engage in yet another long and bloody war. Traditionally, the fall of Saguntum is seen to be the catalyst to warfare. And to some, including Polybius himself, the Mediterranean was seen as a veritable powder keg on the brink of explosion. Rome and Carthage would eventually and inevitably collide. Following the events of the late third century, each party expanded their influence throughout the Mediterranean, and it was in Iberia that these spheres would eventually overlap, resulting in unavoidable hostilities. However, both Rome and Carthage refrained from engaging openly. Each was awaiting a pretext to strike – a pretext that Saguntum would readily provide. While the fall of Saguntum, in retrospect, may conveniently fit within this theory of expanding spheres of influence, the political nature surrounding 218 BC and the years leading up to it may not have been so clear cut. This should bring pause to those ready to retroject modern models of state conduct onto an ancient past. As the following will reveal, the events surrounding Saguntum quickly become confusing and contradictory to this theory.

Rome’s reaction to the siege of Saguntum was inherently ambivalent. Despite sending an embassy to Hannibal outwardly threatening the general in an effort to dissuade him from attacking the city, they did nothing during the siege of Saguntum in 219 BC. At times, seemingly on a whim, Rome places grave importance on the city and then shortly thereafter dismisses it entirely. The role that Saguntum itself played during the late third century BC becomes quickly confusing. Was the city a catalyst to warfare or something else? Were both parties simply looking for a reason to strike?



Polybius states firmly that the siege served as the spark for the entire affair that, to him, was clearly inevitable. But whether or not that notion can be taken seriously first requires a deeper study of Saguntum as a city itself, in addition to their bond with Rome. Polybius suggests that there were ties between Saguntum and Rome previous to its fall, and that Rome had arbitrated a civil dispute resulting in the execution of some Saguntine officials some years earlier. Kramer credits Roman involvement in Saguntine affairs to strong diplomacy on the part of the Massilians – a northern city with established trading connections to Rome. Kramer posits that the Massilians, concerned with Hannibal’s northward expansion and the threat it would present to Massilian economic interests, went to Rome and urged her to become more concerned with Iberian affairs. It was this involvement that enabled the Saguntines to realistically seek Roman arbitration during the 220s. This arbitration would result in some bound, formal or informal, between the two cities. When Hannibal finally attacked Saguntum, Rome was ready to respond in arms on account of her connection.

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